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Abstract 
 
We examine the transition of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Vietnam from a wage 
perspective by decomposing the difference in wage distributions between SOE employees and 
non-SOE employees during the period 2002–2014. In 2002, SOE employees enjoyed higher 
pay than non-SOE employees owing to characteristics difference and any factors other than 
either the price of skills or the characteristics difference, so-called residuals difference. 
University graduates were the main contributor to the endowments difference. However, we 
found that SOE pay schemes converged with those of non-SOEs by 2014, in terms of both the 
price of skills and residuals.  
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1. Introduction 
For many decades, Vietnamese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been given top priority in 
terms of resource allocations in all state plans, with the aim that they would be the leading 
sector of the whole economy. However, both macroeconomic and microeconomic data 
(household and firm surveys) show that SOEs are reducing their employment shares in the 
Vietnamese economy. Similar to Fukase (2014) that used the Vietnamese Enterprises Survey 
Data for 2000–2007 and General Statistics Office (GSO) (2017a) aggregate data, our own 
calculations show that the share of the private sector including both domestic private firms and 
foreign affiliated firms was higher than that of the SOEs by 2005, as in Figure 1. In 2014, the 
private sector was the dominant employer providing paid jobs in Vietnam. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Human capital development and productivity improvements are important to the 
survival and development of firms, and the growth of the private sector has led to increasing 
demand for highly-productive employees. Thus, offering competitive wages and wage-related 
benefits to attract productive employees has become important for the private sector and, 
perhaps, SOEs.  
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the transition of SOEs from a wage 
perspective by decomposing the wage gap distribution between SOE employees and other 
employees that offered formal employment. Our study makes some major contributions to the 
existing literature. First, it is one of few studies that consider differences along the wage 
distribution, rather than making the (strong) assumption that the difference is constant. Second, 
as discussed in detail below, our analysis decomposes the difference in the wage distribution 
into three separate components: the differences in the coefficients, the characteristics 
(endowments), and the residuals (interactions). Third, we are able not only to test for the 
significance of each decomposed component over time, but also to estimate the contribution of 
each covariate to each decomposed component. Our analysis provides new insights into the 
attractiveness of each sector to workers. 
We use data from 2002 to 2014 from the Vietnamese Household Living Standard 
Survey (VHLSS) at four-year intervals. We focus on a formal employment threshold by 
selecting individuals who had only a job, and who were not students, government officers, or 
self-employed and did not work for other households. We apply methods suggested by 
Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Melly (2013) and a recentered influence function 
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regression by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) to decompose the wage distribution between 
SOE employees and non-SOE employees. 
We obtain important evidence of wage convergence between SOE employees and non-
SOE employees. During the period 2002–2014, the price of skills in the two sectors converged. 
We find that the main difference in the wage distribution was the result of the differences in 
the distributions of skills and residuals during 2002–2010. The concentration of university 
graduates in SOEs was the main contributor to the endowments difference. However, we 
observe a gradual change and another important convergence in 2014: the residuals difference 
is vanishing at this point.  
This study is organized as follows. The next section discusses the relevant literature on 
SOEs in transition economies and wage differences between public and private sectors 
particularly in Vietnam. Section 3 presents the data and how we select the samples. Section 4 
provides the econometrics method and the model specification which could provide new 
insights to the difference. In Section 5, we report the results. In Section 6, we summarize and 
discuss some implications for policy and research agendas. 
2. Related literature 
2.1 Changes in SOEs and non-SOEs 
In general, political will plays an important part in determining wages in the public sector, 
whereas the market environment has the leading role in the private sector (Gregory and Borland, 
1999). However, whether SOEs in transition economies is one of the cases is not easy to 
identify. 
Privatization among SOEs occurs in various ways in transition economies. Shi and Sun 
(2016) noted that privatization could occur through a voucher mechanism, such as the almost 
free share transfer to workers in Russia, or through cash auctions combined with public 
subscription, as occurred in Lithuania. SOE privatization in China commenced with the 
philosophy of ‘keep the large, privatize the small’ (Shi and Sun, 2016). From a political 
economy perspective, Brezis and Schnytzer (2003) argued that privatization methods can be 
classified into two types: ‘embezzlement’ (which applies to the practices of the East European 
countries) and ‘Market-Leninism’ (the method applied in China and Vietnam). The difference 
between the two methods is that, under the latter, certain (often higher) shares are retained by 
the state, which enables it to maintain control. Thus, the autonomy of SOE managers might 
	 4 
vary because the state retains a different portion of shares in certain SOEs, especially in the 
case of China and Vietnam, giving it varying degrees of control. 
The number of Vietnamese SOEs is falling sharply, and some of those remaining are 
providing offers for outsiders to buy its shares. The number of SOEs fell from 12,000 to 
approximately 6,000 over the period 1990–1994 (Painter, 2005). Painter (2005) suggested that 
Vietnamese SOE directors won greater autonomy after state subsidies were reduced or 
eliminated over the period 1986–1992. However, by 2004, 2,242 SOEs were equitized but the 
state still held 38.1 percent of the total shares. The proportion of shares owned by the state was 
higher than in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Moldova, Russia, and the Ukraine in 1997 (Loc, 
Lanjouw, and Lensink, 2006). This gradual transition allowed outsiders to buy shares without 
the state losing control of the SOEs (Brezis and Schnytzer, 2003).  
Meanwhile, Vietnamese workers have a greater chance of finding jobs outside SOEs as 
a result of the growth of the private sector. Painter (2005) noted that by the end of 2002, there 
were about 56,000 newly established firms regulated under the first Laws on Enterprises in 
Vietnam. Besides, as seen in Figure 1, the employment share of the private sector was the 
largest by 2014 while that of SOEs reduced sharply. The free trade accessions, including the 
US–Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement in 2001 and Vietnam’s membership in the World 
Trade Organization in 2007, created more paid (formal) jobs and even the possibility of higher 
pay in the private sector. Vu and Yamada (2017) calculated that the proportion of ‘formal’ 
female (male) wage earners (working for either SOEs or non-SOEs) among the non-student, 
female (male) population was 5.8 (7.4) percent in 2002, but rose to 10.69 (11) percent in 2014. 
Since the number of SOEs (non-SOEs) was reducing (increasing), the growth in formal 
employment would be mainly among non-SOEs.  Ramstetter and Ngoc (2007) reported that 
foreign firms paid a higher wage premium than did SOEs in Vietnam during 2002–2006. All 
these facts raise questions about the wage equality between SOEs and non-SOEs in Vietnam. 
In addition, differences in the regulations for SOEs and non-SOEs are declining in 
Vietnam. The first Laws on Enterprises became effective in 2000 and, in 2005, the updated 
Laws on Enterprises 20053  omitted the different rules based on the ownership of firms. 
However, other discrimination from a legal perspective continued. For example, Vu and 
Yamada (2017) noted that, until 2011, the regulations on minimum wages were treated 
differently between public sector and private sector, resulting in different minimum wage 
                                                
3 Following that change, a further amendment was made to the Laws on Enterprises in 2015. 
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levels. Interestingly, the minimum wage for the private sector was higher than that for the 
public sector4. 
2.2 The public–private wage gap in Vietnam prior to accession to the World Trade 
Organization in 2007 
Most of the previous studies on the public–private wage gap in Vietnam focus on the 1990s, 
when private-sector wage earners were not as prevalent as they became from the late 2000s 
and especially from the early 2010s. We find that there are many research gaps to be covered, 
given this changing context. 
Based on analysis of the VHLSS for 1997–1998, Liu (2004) suggested that the private 
wage sector was underdeveloped and that wages were higher in the state sector. Defining the 
government sector and SOEs as the public (state) sector, Liu (2004) suggested that there were 
more females in the public sector than in the private sector. However, we note that including 
the government sector in the definition of the public sector means that, for 1997/98, 650,000 
teachers with direct teaching duties in the general education sector are included in the 
calculation (by 2014, there were 850,000 such teachers) (GSO, 2017b). Over 70 percent of 
these teachers were females (GSO, 2017c). Thus, an alternative definition is required to 
compare SOEs and non-SOEs, especially in the new context, as shown in Figure 1. 
Comparing the situations in 1993 and 2006, Imbert (2013) suggested that the wage gap 
between public employees and other employees was widening because the public sector 
selected the best workers. Imbert (2013) also implied that public-sector employees were 
underpaid during the 1990s, but that wages subsequently began to equalize with those of 
private employees. The question of why the best workers preferred to join or remain with the 
SOEs, given that they were often underpaid, or at best equally paid, has not been fully explained. 
Imbert (2013) shared the view of Liu (2004) that women were better off in the public sector. 
Meanwhile, evidence from the Vietnam Enterprises Survey, presented by Fukase (2014), and 
our calculation in Figure 1, show more women have continued to join the private sector and, 
from 2007, there were more women concentrated in the private sector, especially in foreign 
affiliated firms. 
                                                
4 For example, government decree 03/2006/ND-CP set the minimum wage for the foreign sector at VND 870,000 
in March 2006. The minimum for other sectors was VND 350,000. In 2008, dedicated to Region 4 (detailed region 
classification can be found in the corresponding decree), government decree 111/2008/ND-CP set a minimum 
wage of VND 950,000 for the foreign sector but its preceding decree 110/2008/ND-CP regulated VND 650,000 
as the minimum wage for SOEs. In 2011, the minimum wage for the private sector in Region 4 was VND 1.4 
million but for other sectors, it was VND 830,000. 
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Moreover, studies using the mean difference may not sufficiently capture the inequality 
in the new context. Vu and Yamada (2017) showed that the gender wage gap was not constant 
along the distributions in Vietnam during the period 2002–2014. The public and private 
enterprise wage gap distribution may not be an exception. 
3. Data 
We used the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) for 2002, 2006, 2010, and 
2014, conducted by the General Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam. The two-stage stratified 
surveys have a country representative sample with a design similar to that of the Living 
Standard Measurement Study by the World Bank. The household sample sizes were 29,532 
households (2002), 9,189 households (2006), 46,995 households (2010), and 9,399 households 
(2014). The surveys provide detailed information for each individual on personal 
characteristics (including age, gender, and education level) as well as information on paid work 
and wage premiums (including working hours, salary, and bonuses in cash and in kind). 
We chose to focus on individuals who had a job, and who were not students, state 
officers, self-employed, or working for other households. We selected age thresholds from 15 
to 55 years for both genders. A selection of up to 60 years of age would capture more informal 
female workers because the retirement age for women is 55 years and it is a very strict 
requirement in SOEs. 
The wage calculation is the crucial issue. If salaries in cash are counted as the only 
contribution to the wage, any comparison between SOEs and non-SOEs would be biased 
because proportions of other related income than salaries differ. Thus, we counted any income 
related to the paid work in calculating the total earned wage. More specifically, the total earned 
wage equals the sum of salaries, bonuses for holidays, bonuses in cash and in kind, and any 
other income related to the paid job within the 12 months prior the survey. Similarly, we 
summed the total working hours in the same period for each individual. The total earned wage 
was converted to 2010 real prices using World Bank CPI5 and divided into the total working 
hours to construct the real wage rate. Then we transformed the real wage rate to logarithmic 
form. We trimmed 0.1 percent of respondents from each survey at both tails of the wage 
distribution prior to undertaking any analysis. The descriptive statistics are provided in Table 
1. 
                                                
5 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL?end=2015&locations=VN&start=2000 
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
The descriptive statistics show some interesting trends. As seen in Table 1, SOE 
employees had a higher average real wage than non-SOE employees in 2002 (about 17 percent 
higher). However, in 2014, they had a 3 percent lower average real wage than non-SOE 
employees. When the number of work hours is considered, the mean logarithm of the real wage 
rate difference between SOE employees and non-SOE employees gradually reduced over time; 
it was 11.6 percent higher for SOE employees in 2002, fell to 6.8 percent higher in 2006, to 
3.9 percent higher in 2010, and finally to only 3.4 percent higher in 2014. This is because 
although the average work hours of SOE employees was rather stable, those of non-SOE 
employees increased over time. 
4. Methods 
We apply two important methods in our analysis. The first method was suggested by 
Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Melly (2013) (hereafter referred to as CFM). The second 
method is a recentered influence function (RIF) regression, using the unconditional quantile 
regression by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009). The key point of both methods is to estimate 
a counterfactual distribution of the first group of workers based on a component distributed as 
if it were the second group’s and the remaining components as if they were those of the first 
group. 
4.1 The CFM method 
The objective of the method is to estimate two important counterfactual distributions. The first 
is estimated from the characteristics distribution for the group of employees working for SOEs, 
the median (mean) coefficients from the group of employees working for SOEs, and the 
residual distribution from the group of employees working for non-SOEs. The second 
distribution is constructed from the characteristics distribution for the group of employees 
working for SOEs, and the conditional distribution of the skills of employees working for non-
SOEs. Following the procedure suggested by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), the total 
difference is decomposed into three components: coefficients, characteristics, and residuals. !"#$%	'()#"*$%	+$,(	,$-	 = 	/011(*(2)(	02	*('0/3$%'	 + 	/011(*(2)(	02	)"(110)0(2#'	 +	/011(*(2)(	02	)ℎ$*$)#(*0'#0)'.         (1) 
More specifically, similarly to the procedure by Melly (2005), first, the method 
estimates the counterfactual distribution of the wages, 7 89:9;<=>, @<=> , that would be 
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received by non-SOE employees if their skill distribution was similar to those of the SOE 
employees. 89:9;<=> are the estimated coefficients of non-SOE employees from a quantile 
regression by Koenker and Bassett (1978) and @<=> is the characteristics vector of employees 
in SOEs. The characteristics difference is the difference between 7 89:9;<=>, @<=>  and 7 89:9;<=>, @9:9;<=> . The counterfactual wage distribution, if the median returns to skills 
for non-SOE employees were exactly the same as those of SOE employees, and if the residuals 
distribution were that of the non-SOE employees, is 7 8ABCDEF,GBHICJKJLDEF, @<=> . The 
coefficients difference is the gap between 7 8ABCDEF,GBHICJKJLDEF, @<=>  and 7 89:9;<=>, @<=> . Thus, the detailed breakdown of (1)6 is: 7 8<=>, @<=> − 7 89:9;<=>, @9:9;<=> = 7 8<=>, @<=> −7 8ABCDEF,GBHICJKJLDEF, @<=> + 	7 8ABCDEF,GBHICJKJLDEF, @<=> − 7 89:9;<=>, @<=> +7 89:9;<=>, @<=> − 7 89:9;<=>, @9:9;<=> .      (2) 
4.2 RIF regression and Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition 
We apply the RIF regression suggested by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009). In this specific 
case (using quantiles), the RIF regression can be called an unconditional quantile regression. 
The recentered influence function, NOP(%+$,(; 7) , is a sum of the influence function, OP(%+$,(; 7), and the distributional statistic of interest, 7. %+$,( is logarithm of the real wage 
rate. Then, the estimation results are used to decompose the contribution of each of the 
covariates using a procedure 7  suggested by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). More 
specifically, the difference in the logarithm of the real wage rate between the two groups at 
each quantile T can be decomposed as follows: 
∆T = NOP %+$,(<=>, 7<=>,V − (NOP %+$,(9:9;<=>, 79:9;<=>,V ), and    (3) 
∆T = W9:9;<=> X<=>,V − X9:9;<=>,V + W<=> − W9:9;<=> X9:9;<=>,V + W<=> − W9:9;<=> (X<=>,V −X9:9;<=>,V).           (4) 
This can be simplified as follows: 
                                                
6 A user-written Stata command, ‘cdeco_jmp’ by Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Melly eased our estimations. 
The command can be found at https://sites.google.com/site/blaisemelly/computer-programs/inference-on-
counterfactual-distributions. 
7 As suggested by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux, we use another user-written Stata command, ‘oaxaca8’ by Jann 
(2008) to decompose the results from the RIF regression. The detailed guideline from Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux 
for RIF regression and decompositions can be found at http://economics.ubc.ca/faculty-and-staff/nicole-fortin/. 
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!"#$%	,$-	 = 	)"(110)0(2#'	/011(*(2)( + 	(2/"+Y(2#'	/011(*(2)( + 	02#(*$)#0"2'	/011(*(2)(.  (5) 
Both methods, CFM and RIF regression, have advantages and disadvantages. One of 
the most important advantages of the first method is that it constructs simultaneous confidence 
sets, which help to test the functional hypotheses, including zero influence and constant 
influence. The test results help us to confirm whether the difference is minor or large and 
whether it is constant along the distribution or polarized. However, the CFM method cannot 
provide detail on the contribution of each covariate to the decomposed components. In contrast, 
the second method provides a possible linear decomposition of each of the covariates. Thus, 
by using the two methods, we are able to utilize the advantages of each method. 
4.3 Specifications 
We set the covariates as experience, based on age, and a set of educational dummies. Following 
the suggestion of Vu and Yamada (2017), we do not use projected experience, which is 
calculated as age minus years of schooling and minus seven years. We also use the squared 
age. The set of dummies for highest education obtained are, for school years completed, five 
years (primary school graduates), nine years (secondary school graduates), and 12 years (high 
school graduates), and, for post-school qualifications, three-year college graduates, four-year 
or more university graduates, and those with vocational degrees. This specification is the same 
in all data sets used. In the counterfactual distribution estimations, we set a 100-repetition 
bootstrap. 
5. Results 
5.1 The total wage gap and its decomposed components 
The total wage gap between SOE employees and non-SOE employees was persistent. However, 
the coefficients differences were minor during the period 2002-2014 and the residuals 
differences diminished by 2014. We have four important pieces of evidence supporting these 
findings. 
First, both methods showed that the total wage gap between SOE workers and non-
SOE workers was statistically significant, particularly for the middle and middle-to-high wage 
distribution groups, as seen in Table 2. The tests for all quantile effects equal to zero were 
rejected in all years (see columns T1 and T2 of Table 2). The persistent gap for the middle and 
middle-to-high wage distribution groups is consistent with the findings of Turunen (2004) for 
Russia. Turunen (2004) showed that white-collar workers for the state who held a university 
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degree and a managerial position were more likely to stay in the state sector. We note that the 
total difference is not constant along the income distribution. Except for 2002, all test results 
for the constant quantile effect in the CFM estimations (see column T2) support this argument 
(Figure 2 also illustrates this trend). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Second, we found that the coefficients difference was statistically insignificant in all selected 
waves. As shown in column T1 of Table 2, none of the test results for quantile effects different 
from zero were rejected. Third, the residuals difference disappeared in 2014 because the test 
for all corresponding quantile effects equaling zero was not rejected (see column T1 of Table 
2). We will analyze this in detail in later in the paper. 
[Insert Figures 3, 4, and 5 here] 
Fourth, the main contributor to the total difference was the characteristics (endowments) 
distribution difference. This is clear from both estimation methods. Tests for the zero quantile 
effect for the characteristics difference were all rejected, as seen in column T1 of Table 2. 
However, the characteristics difference, which was higher at the right tail of the wage 
difference distribution (see Figure 5), returns to being flat and, finally, becomes constant along 
the distribution in 2014, as the tests in column T2 of Table 2 show. 
As the characteristics/endowments difference was the most important contributor to the 
total wage difference, we further break down the contribution of each characteristic using RIF 
regressions and the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition. 
5.2 University graduates and endowments difference  
We found university graduates were the most important contributor to the endowments 
difference between SOE employees and non-SOE employees. More specifically, in 2002, 
university graduates were corresponding with increments of 57/38/40/52 percent 
(0.04/0.05/0.09/0.13 log points) of the endowments difference at 25th/50th/75th/90th percentiles, 
as shown in columns 4, 7, 10, and 13 of Table 3. This suggests university graduates were more 
available in SOEs at these percentiles of the endowments difference distribution in 2002. In 
2006, they contributed 36/25/31/38 percent (0.04/0.04/0.08/0.18 log points) of the endowments 
difference at the corresponding percentiles. In 2010, they were 33/38/48 percent 
(0.04/0.07/0.11 log points) at 50th, 75th, 90th percentiles. In 2014, they returned to 33 percent 
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(0.03 log points) at 25th/25th/50th/75th percentiles and 43 percent (0.09 log points) at 90th 
percentile.  
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
However, during 2006-2014, at 10th percentile, university graduates were important 
contributor to reduce the endowments difference as the quantile effects are becoming negative 
(column 1 of Table 3). Within the scope of endowments difference, the negative coefficient of 
“university” merely means SOE employees received lower income because they were less 
likely to have university degrees at this 10th percentile of the “income” distribution. It may be 
the case that non-SOEs were attractive and appeared more accessible to fresh university 
graduates commencing their career. 
This result does not contradict the findings that university graduates in SOEs received 
lower returns to “university” in SOEs, which was found for the 75th and 90th percentiles in 2002 
(columns 11 and 12 of Table 3), the 90th percentile (column 14) in 2006, and at the 25th, 75th, 
and 90th percentiles (columns 5, 11, and 14) in 2010. We would argue that precedent regulations 
to lay off public employees based on education is the most likely explanation. Friedman (2004) 
indicated that, based on a survey conducted in 2000, Vietnamese SOE workers were in higher 
demand for formal training than were non-SOE workers. Thus, SOE workers may have sought 
to upgrade their educational qualifications so as to retain their positions when they were 
expecting the size of SOEs to contract. Over-concentration of university graduates may have 
occurred because, although employees were upgrading their educational qualifications, labor 
productivity may not have increased.8 
5.3 The convergence of pay schemes between SOEs and non-SOEs in 2014 
We found that the pay schemes of SOEs converged with those of non-SOEs by 2014. First, the 
differences in coefficients were minimal in 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. Second, the residuals 
difference became statistically insignificant in 2014, as shown in column T1 of Table 2. Third, 
the characteristics differences were declining over time for the middle-to-high wage 
distribution groups as seen in Table 2. The remaining (positive) difference is the result of some 
component of the skills distribution. Except for 2010, when women were paid less in SOEs in 
terms of the average price of skills (see columns 8, 11, and 14 of Table 3), we found little 
evidence that women were paid differently by the price of skills in SOEs compared with non-
                                                
8 Friedman (2004) suggested that Vietnamese SOE workers even had lower labor productivity compared to non-
SOE workers. 
	 12 
SOEs in other years and percentiles. Our result differs from the results of Liu (2004), not only 
because of the time period difference but also because of the data selection.  
Finally, we anticipate that the remaining difference between SOEs and non-SOEs will 
become increasingly smaller in the years to come. This is because there would be more options 
in the labor market for young and highly-educated workers with equivalent pay and because 
there would be little incentive for highly-educated workers to join SOEs, but more benefits 
from leaving SOEs. In 2014, the skill price was negative for most skill levels at the 75th and 
90th percentiles, for SOE employees (see columns 11 and 14 of Table 3). At the 50th percentile, 
the coefficients difference was negative despite some of the education level groups being paid 
more by SOEs. As a possible consequence, better-educated, highly-productive workers in these 
segments would be likely to leave the SOEs,9 which would lower the current endowment 
differences. However, we also acknowledge that those, who are relatively ‘old’ and self-
selected to work for SOEs in the past, will remain. This is because they may have difficulty in 
matching their employable skills with the needs from non-SOEs at equivalent or higher wage 
rate. 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
In this paper, we have examined the transition of SOEs from a wage perspective, by 
decomposing the wage distribution difference between SOE and non-SOE employees during 
the period 2002–2014, using four Vietnamese household surveys of the same design and the 
same sample selection. Although SOE employees received higher pay in 2002 as a result of 
the characteristics difference and residuals, the coefficients difference was minimal along the 
wage distribution during 2002–2014. The characteristics difference fell over time at middle 
and middle-to-high wage distribution groups. University graduates were the main contributor 
to the endowments difference. However, by 2014, the residuals difference vanished and the 
pay schemes between SOEs and non-SOEs had converged. 
The convergence of pay schemes between SOEs and non-SOEs has some implications 
for policy and research agendas. First, the Vietnamese government should keep treating SOEs 
as equivalent to non-SOEs from a legal perspective. Limiting the privileges applied to any 
sector creates a more competitive environment, increases wage equality among firms with 
different ownership structures, and results in more efficient resource allocations. Second, 
                                                
9 The employees may stay if they have supervisory posts, as suggested by Turunen (2004). However, SOEs 
cannot create enough such posts for all of these workers. 
	 13 
unless the state wishes to support inefficiency through public budgets/assets, more autonomy 
for SOE managers to restructure the current pay schemes is a must. Third, as SOEs pay as 
much as non-SOEs, a convergence in the characteristics difference is foreseeable. High 
productivity employees, if receiving lower pay, might leave the SOEs. However, rather than 
state policies attempting to prevent this, allowing it to happen will provide incentives for SOEs 
to restructure their pay schemes to become more attractive to high productivity employees. If 
SOEs can successfully change, the demand for expensive formal training that is not necessarily 
linked to higher productivity would disappear. In contrast, the demand for informal training 
and on-the-job training to improve productivity will rise. Finally, future studies of the public–
private enterprise wage gap in Vietnam should search for evidence of the disappearance of the 
characteristics differences. Once this has been found, any different settings to distinguish 
between SOEs and non-SOEs in wage-related estimations would become redundant. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables 2002    2006    2010    2014    
 Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Nominal wage 
rate 
10,120 8,996 11,913 8,902 15,415 11,362 18,971 13,393 35,808 33,534 39,859 39,656 60,496 40,746 58,659 36,650 
Real wage rate 20,340 18,080 23,943 17,891 23,954 17,656 29,480 20,812 35,808 33,534 39,859 39,656 42,115 28,366 40,836 25,515 
Log wage rate 1.99 0.72 2.22 0.66 2.21 0.55 2.36 0.68 2.55 0.62 2.65 0.77 2.64 0.67 2.73 0.65 
Work hours 2,200 673 2,208 572 2,283 750 2,265 590 2,303 677 2,152 685 2,530 460 2,287 532 
Female 0.46 0.49 0.455 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.45 0.50 
Age 29.53 9.45 34.78 9.85 28.54 9.51 35.32 10.70 30.39 9.17 34.69 10.34 30.78 8.94 35.91 10.38 
5th grade 0.23 0.42 0.14 0.35 0.22 0.42 0.11 0.31 0.18 0.39 0.11 0.31 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.32 
9th grade 0.29 0.45 0.22 0.41 0.29 0.45 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.17 0.38 
12th grade 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.38 0.32 0.47 0.42 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.32 0.47 0.40 0.49 
3-year college 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24 
University 0.08 0.27 0.15 0.36 0.07 0.26 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.33 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.38 0.23 0.42 
Vocational degree 0.09 0.28 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.41 0.37 0.48 0.23 0.42 0.35 0.48 0.19 0.39 0.31 0.46 
Urban 0.44 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.67 0.47 0.51 0.50 0.65 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.67 0.47 
Private firms 0.58 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.46 0.00 0.00 
Foreign firms 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 
Collective 0.16 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.00 
N (sample size) 1,983  2,468  1,088  523  7,809  1,882  1,960  385  
 
Notes: Nominal (real) wage rate unit is in Vietnamese dong (at 2010 price) per hour. Log wage rate is the logarithm of real wage rate. SOE: State-owned enterprises. Non-
SOE: not state-owned enterprises. SD: standard deviation.  
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Table 2. Decomposition of the public–private enterprise wage difference distribution 
 
Year Methods Percentiles          Tests  
  10th  25th  50th  75th  90th  T1 T2  
Total gap 
2002 RIF  0.267*** (0.032) 0.232*** (0.025) 0.185*** (0.023) 0.210*** (0.027) 0.250*** (0.040)   
 CFM 0.271*** (0.034) 0.225*** (0.025) 0.200*** (0.022) 0.194*** (0.026) 0.242*** (0.040) R A 
2006 RIF  0.119* (0.066) 0.083* (0.046) 0.218*** (0.043) 0.359*** (0.045) 0.356*** (0.071)   
 CFM –0.099 (0.061) 0.076* (0.041) 0.212*** (0.037) 0.325*** (0.044) 0.306*** (0.060) R R 
2010 RIF 0.217*** (0.033) 0.004 (0.024) 0.186*** (0.024) 0.286*** (0.024) 0.233*** (0.034)   
 CFM –0.211*** (0.032) –0.000 (0.025) 0.173*** (0.022) 0.263*** (0.022) 0.231*** (0.034) R R 
2014 RIF  0.005 (0.082) 0.024 (0.045) 0.084** (0.040) 0.166*** (0.041) 0.052 (0.053)   
 CFM 0.063 (0.095) 0.037 (0.048) 0.105*** (0.035) 0.106*** (0.031) 0.055 (0.047) R R 
 Coefficients 
2002 RIF  0.092** (0.040) 0.045 (0.028) –0.005 (0.023) 0.031 (0.025) 0.086** (0.036)   
2006 RIF  0.195*** (0.066) –0.167** (0.067) –0.122** (0.050) 0.094** (0.045) 0.077 (0.064)   
2010 RIF  0.288*** (0.032) 0.088*** (0.023) –0.032 (0.025) 0.133*** (0.022) 0.087*** (0.029)   
2014 RIF  0.119 (0.081) –0.127** (0.054) –0.094** (0.043) 0.022 (0.039) –0.053 (0.051)   
2002 CFM 0.061** (0.029) 0.023 (0.030) 0.023 (0.028) 0.037 (0.031) 0.022 (0.043) A A 
2006 CFM –0.015 (0.047) –0.014 (0.042) 0.040 (0.047) 0.024 (0.047) 0.012 (0.060) A A 
2010 CFM –0.073*** (0.026) –0.016 (0.022) 0.024 (0.021) 0.045** (0.022) 0.023 (0.027) A R 
2014 CFM –0.090* (0.053) –0.069* (0.041) –0.029 (0.037) –0.023 (0.037) 0.031 (0.044) A A 
 Endowments             
2002 RIF  0.023  (0.021) 0.066*** (0.017) 0.130*** (0.016) 0.216*** (0.020) 0.251*** (0.031)   
2006 RIF  –0.249*** (0.071) 0.108*** (0.019) 0.164*** (0.018) 0.260*** (0.027) 0.481*** (0.065)   
2010 RIF  –0.101*** (0.022) –0.168*** (0.017) 0.124*** (0.008) 0.182*** (0.013) 0.227*** (0.022)   
2014 RIF –0.182*** (0.053) 0.087*** (0.017) 0.091*** (0.014) 0.181*** (0.024) 0.213*** (0.035)   
 Characteristics             
2002 CFM 0.038* (0.020) 0.080*** (0.016) 0.130 (0.016) 0.184 (0.019) 0.213*** (0.036) R R 
2006 CFM 0.101*** (0.026) 0.157*** (0.019) 0.167*** (0.020) 0.249*** (0.032) 0.293*** (0.042) R R 
2010 CFM 0.110*** (0.010) 0.112*** (0.009) 0.130*** 
 
(0.010) 0.155*** (0.013) 0.173*** (0.020) R R 
2014 CFM 0.152*** (0.033) 0.110*** (0.017) 0.106*** (0.017) 0.124*** (0.018) 0.148*** (0.030) R A 
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Table 2 (cont.) 
 
Year Methods Percentiles          Tests  
  10th  25th  50th  75th  90th  T1 T2  
 Interactions             
2002 RIF 0.153*** (0.027) 0.122*** (0.020) 0.060*** (0.017) –0.037* (0.020) –0.087*** (0.031)   
2006 RIF 0.174** (0.073) 0.141*** (0.047) 0.175*** (0.037) 0.005 (0.040) –0.202*** (0.076)   
2010 RIF  0.030 (0.022) 0.084*** (0.015) 0.093*** (0.014) –0.028** (0.014) –0.080*** (0.023)   
2014 RIF 0.068 (0.057) 0.064** (0.029) 0.088*** (0.025) –0.037 (0.029) –0.108** (0.043)   
 Residuals             
2002 CFM 0.173*** (0.036) 0.122*** (0.021) 0.046*** (0.015) –0.026 (0.025) 0.007 (0.046) R R 
2006 CFM –0.184*** (0.060) –0.067** (0.032) 0.005 (0.243) 0.052 (0.034) 0.001 0.046 A R 
2010 CFM –0.248*** (0.026) –0.097*** (0.017) 0.019 (0.012) 0.063*** (0.015) 0.035 (0.027) R R 
2014 CFM 0.001 (0.079) –0.004 (0.033) 0.028 (0.022) 0.005 (0.025) 0.062 (0.050) A A 
Notes: The symbols ***, **, and * denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. RIF is the recentered influence function regression. CFM is the method by 
Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Melly (2013). 
T1: Test results for H0: No effect, QE(tau) = 0 for all taus from 1–99. If H0 is rejected (at the 10 percent level), this is denoted by ‘R’. If H0 is not rejected, this is denoted by 
‘A’. This test is stronger than the absence of any mean effect. 
T2: Test results for H0: Constant effect: QE(tau) = QE(0.5) (at the 10 percent level). If H0 is not rejected, this is denoted by ‘A’, and otherwise by ‘R’. 
	 19 
Table 3. Oaxaca–Blinder linear decomposition after recentered influence function regressions 
 
Variables 10th      25th      50th      75th      90th      
 E  C  I  E  C  I  E  C  I  E  C  I  E  C  I  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  
2002                               
Sex 0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  –0.03  0.00  0.00  –0.05 ** 0.00  0.00  –0.04  0.00  
Age 0.54 *** –0.14  –0.03  0.61 *** –1.40 ** –0.25 ** 0.51 *** –1.82 *** –0.32 *** 0.38 *** –1.67 *** –0.30 *** 0.17 * –0.05  –0.01  
Age^2 –0.58 *** 0.46  0.16  –0.61 *** 0.96 *** 0.34 *** –0.47 *** 1.04 *** 0.37 *** –0.32 *** 0.88 *** 0.32 *** –0.09  0.01  0.00  
5th grade –0.01  0.02  –0.01  –0.02 ** –0.02  0.01  –0.01  –0.02  0.01  –0.01 ** –0.02  0.01  –0.01  –0.01  0.00  
9th grade 0.01  0.11 ** –0.03 ** –0.01  0.03  –0.01  –0.01  0.00  0.00  –0.01 ** –0.01  0.00  –0.01  –0.01  0.00  
12th grade 0.00  0.03  0.00  –0.01 * –0.01  0.00  –0.01 ** –0.02  0.00  –0.01 ** –0.04 * 0.00  –0.01 * –0.04  0.00  
College 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 ** 0.00  0.00  0.01 *** 0.00  0.00  0.02 ** –0.01  –0.01  
University 0.02 *** 0.02  0.01  0.04 *** 0.00  0.00  0.05 *** 0.00  0.00  0.09 *** –0.02 ** –0.02 ** 0.13 *** –0.06 *** –0.06 *** 
Vocational 0.04 ** 0.02  0.03  0.05 *** 0.01  0.02  0.06 *** 0.00  –0.01  0.09 *** –0.03 *** –0.05 *** 0.04 ** –0.02  –0.03  
Constant   –0.42      0.46      0.86 ***     1.00 ***     0.31    
Total 0.02  0.09 ** 0.15 *** 0.07 *** 0.04  0.12 *** 0.13 *** –0.01  0.06 *** 0.22 *** 0.03  –0.04 * 0.25 *** 0.09 ** –0.09 *** 
2006 
Sex 0.00  –0.01  0.00  0.01 * 0.02  0.00  0.01 ** –0.01  0.00  0.01 * –0.02  0.00  0.01  –0.10 * 0.01  
Age –1.11 *** –3.81 ** 0.73 * 0.38 *** 2.70 *** 0.64 ** 0.48 *** 1.49 * 0.35 * 0.38 *** 0.14  0.03  0.41 ** –1.23  –0.29  
Age^2 0.96 *** 1.81 * –0.61 * –0.33 *** –1.03 ** –0.52 ** –0.39 *** –0.47  –0.24  –0.28 *** –0.03  –0.01  –0.20  0.40  0.20  
5th grade 0.07  –0.04  –0.04  –0.04 *** –0.08  0.04  –0.01 * –0.01  0.00  –0.01  0.02  –0.01  –0.02  –0.04  0.02  
9th grade 0.05  –0.14  –0.03  –0.02 * 0.00  0.00  –0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  –0.01  –0.08  0.01  
12th grade –0.06  –0.12  0.03  0.04 *** –0.07  –0.02  0.02 ** –0.01  0.00  0.02 ** –0.02  0.00  0.04 *** –0.10  –0.03  
College –0.04  –0.04  0.02  0.02 ** –0.01  –0.01  0.01 ** 0.00  0.00  0.03 *** 0.00  0.00  0.04 ** –0.01  –0.02  
University –0.09 ** –0.10  0.05  0.04 *** 0.01  0.01  0.04 *** 0.04 ** 0.04 * 0.08 *** 0.00  0.00  0.18 *** –0.10 *** –0.10 ** 
Vocational –0.02  –0.06  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01 * 0.03  0.02  0.02 ** 0.00  0.00  0.03  –0.02  –0.01  
Constant   2.71 **     –1.73 **     –1.19 **     0.00      1.34    
Total –0.25 *** 0.20 *** 0.17 ** 0.11 *** –0.17 ** 0.14 *** 0.16 *** –0.12 ** 0.18 *** 0.26 *** 0.09 ** 0.00  0.48 *** 0.08  –0.20 *** 
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Table 3 (cont.) 
 
Variables 10th      25th      50th      75th      90th      
 E  C  I  E  C  I  E  C  I  E  C  I  E  C  I  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  
2010                               
Sex –0.01 ** 0.02  0.00  –0.01 *** 0.03  0.00  0.01 *** –0.09 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** –0.05 ** 0.01 ** 0.01 *** –0.05 * 0.01  
Age –0.64 *** –2.20 ** 0.27 ** –0.62 *** –2.45 *** 0.30 *** 0.30 *** 1.04 ** 0.15 ** 0.20 *** 0.06  0.01  0.12 ** –0.10  –0.01  
Age^2 0.58 *** 1.06 ** –0.25 ** 0.55 *** 1.14 *** –0.26 *** –0.26 *** –0.34  –0.10  –0.14 *** –0.05  –0.02  –0.04  –0.04  –0.01  
5th grade 0.02  –0.01  0.00  0.02 * –0.02  –0.01  –0.01 *** 0.00  0.00  –0.01 *** –0.03 * 0.01  –0.01 ** –0.03  0.01  
9th grade 0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01 * –0.03  –0.01  –0.01 *** 0.01  0.00  –0.01 *** –0.04  0.01  –0.01 ** –0.07 * 0.01 * 
12th grade –0.01  0.06  –0.01  –0.03 * –0.02  0.00  0.04 *** –0.02  –0.01  0.03 *** –0.11 *** –0.04 *** 0.03 *** –0.10 ** –0.03 ** 
College 0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  –0.02 *** 0.00  0.00  –0.02 *** 0.00  
University –0.03 ** –0.02  0.01  –0.04 *** –0.07 *** 0.02 ** 0.04 *** 0.03 ** 0.01 * 0.07 *** –0.05 *** –0.02 *** 0.11 *** –0.15 *** –0.06 *** 
Vocational –0.02 * –0.03  0.01  –0.04 *** –0.09 *** 0.03 *** 0.01 *** 0.06 *** 0.04 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 * 0.01 * 0.01 ** 0.02  0.01  
Constant   1.38 **     1.60 ***     –0.72 **     0.41      0.64 *   
Total –0.10 *** 0.29 *** 0.03  –0.17 *** 0.09 *** 0.08 *** 0.12 *** –0.03  0.09 *** 0.18 *** 0.13 *** –0.03 ** 0.23 *** 0.09 *** –0.08 *** 
2014 
Sex 0.00  –0.11  –0.01  0.01 * 0.01  0.00  0.01 * –0.04  0.00  0.01 * –0.04  0.00  0.01  –0.05  0.01  
Age –0.89 *** 3.46  –0.49  0.68 *** –0.82  –0.14  0.36 *** 0.42  0.07  0.32 *** 0.60  0.10  0.25 *** –0.54  –0.09  
Age^2 0.76 ** –1.99  0.53  –0.63 *** 0.45  0.16  –0.33 *** –0.04  –0.01  –0.24 *** –0.27  –0.10  –0.14  0.13  0.05  
5th grade 0.04  –0.10  –0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  –0.01 * –0.06 ** 0.02  –0.01 * –0.06  0.02  
9th grade 0.11  –0.21  –0.09  –0.02 * 0.08  –0.02  –0.01 ** 0.08 * –0.02  –0.02 *** –0.03  0.01  –0.02 *** –0.10  0.03  
12th grade –0.11  –0.51  0.10  0.02 ** 0.12  0.03  0.01 ** 0.09 * 0.02  0.03 *** –0.07  –0.02  0.03 *** –0.14 * –0.04  
College –0.01  –0.10 * 0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  –0.01  0.00  0.00  –0.03 ** 0.00  
University –0.09  –0.27  0.07  0.03 ** 0.06  0.02  0.03 ** 0.06 ** 0.02 * 0.06 ** –0.10 *** –0.04 ** 0.09 ** –0.19 *** –0.07 ** 
Vocational –0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02 *** 0.01  0.01  0.02 *** –0.02  –0.01  0.01  –0.02  –0.01  
Constant   –0.06      –0.07      –0.68      0.02      0.95    
Total –0.18 *** 0.12  0.07  0.09 *** –0.13 ** 0.06 ** 0.09 *** –0.09 ** 0.09 *** 0.18 *** 0.02  –0.04  0.21 *** –0.05  –0.11 ** 
Notes: The symbols ***, **, and * denote p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. E: Endowments difference; C: Coefficients difference; and I: 
Interactions difference. 
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Figure 1. Employment share by state-owned enterprises (SOE), private domestic enterprises 
(PDE), and foreign-owned enterprises (FOE) 
 
  
 
Notes: SOE: State-owned enterprises. PDE: Private domestic (non-foreign) enterprises. FOE: foreign-owned 
(affiliated) enterprises. Left figure took data from GSO (2017a) while right figure was based on authors’ 
calculations using VHLSS data.
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Figure 2. Total difference 
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Figure 3. Coefficients difference 
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Figure 4. Residuals difference 
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Figure 5. Characteristics difference 
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